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In 2015 Shoshana Zuboff coined the term “surveillance capitalism” to describe a new 
regime of accumulation, according to which analysing and intervening in behaviour 
becomes directly profitable. Companies such as Google offer free services (for 
example, email), but use these to collect information on their users. This information 
– analyzed into ersatz subjectivities – is then sold on to advertisers seeking highly 
targeted audiences. Although etymologically, surveillance refers to ‘watching over,’ 
surveillance capitalism’s relationship to ‘watching’ is hardly straightforward. 
Information on online users may be directly operationalized (by a company’s 
proprietary machine-learning algorithm, seeking to infer gender from online activity, 
for example). However, this information – and the subjects from whom it is 
expropriated – is hardly ‘watched’ or ‘seen’ in the strict sense – either by machines 
or by human attendants. Thus, surveillance capitalism has a paradoxical relationship 
to watching, and to the visible. In light of these complexities, what might a theory of 
surveillance capitalist aesthetics look like? How might artworks and other cultural 
artefacts try to make sense of the (in)consequential nature of the sensible within this 
regime of accumulation – with its hyper-visible subjects and hyper-proprietary means 
for their interpretation? This talk opens up a few avenues of exploration toward a 
surveillance capitalist aesthetics, by remarking on the aesthetics of reputational 
value, and the particularities of addressivity in surveillance-capitalist scenarios. 
 
 
Full Text:  
 
In finance, there is often a strange relationship between attempts to predict 
future outcomes and the actual course of events through which these outcomes 
arrive. Often, attempts to calculate future risk actively intervene in the very futures 
they purport to merely describe. These phenomena have already been studied for 
decades under the loose rubric ‘the performativity of finance’. Sociologist Michel 
Callon’s edited volume The Laws of Markets (1998) outlined several of the ways in 
which attempts to study markets in fact did something to them – intervened in that 
which they seemed to merely study. Picking up on this work, sociologist Donald 
MacKenzie has further interrogated the performativity of finance – detailing, for 
instance, how the development of the Black-Scholes options pricing model in 1973 
actively contributed to producing the world which the calculation intimated (2003), 
and differentiating between general performativity (in which “an aspect of 
economics… is used by participants in economic processes”) and effective 
performativity (“the practical use of an aspect of economics has an effect on 
economic processes”) in finance (2005: 31). Scholars have continued to nuance 
these accounts of the complexities between measuring, predicting, studying and 
intervening in finance (for instance, LaBerge, 2016). Indeed, in his last book, Randy 
Martin extrapolates on the entanglement of prediction and knowledge in finance, 
arguing that derivatives perform a limit of knowledge. Ostensibly mitigating risk, the 
predictions associated with derivatives “enhance volatility as they amplify risk” 
(Martin, 2015: 62); ubiquitous calculations of future value, seeking some kind of 
certainty, in fact produce yet more uncertainty, as they are unable to fully account for 
their own effect as measurements. Yet this uncertainty is far from a debilitating 
condition for finance; rather, it is derivatives’ very horizon of opportunity. The 
derivative form thrives on volatility, turning “the contestability of fundamental value 
into a tradable commodity” (Martin, 2015:63).  
 
If, in finance, attempts to measure and predict future value inevitably 
intervene in the very values they seek to determine – instantiating a complex dance 
between certainty and uncertainty – then what can be made of how these slippery, 
performative, predictive procedures enter into more and more registers of daily life – 
according to what Randy Martin termed “the financialization of daily life” (2002)?  
 
One place to look, to answer this, would be to what Shoshana Zuboff termed 
“surveillance capitalism” (2015). Zuboff coined this term in 2015 to describe a new 
regime of accumulation, according to which analysing and intervening in behaviour 
becomes directly profitable – particularly for online platforms. Companies such as 
Google offer free services (for example, email), but use these services to collect data 
on their users. This information – analyzed into ersatz subjectivities – is then sold on 
to advertisers seeking highly targeted audiences for their adverts. Like the 
performative financial instruments alluded to above, surveillance capitalism, which 
financializes behaviour, might be understood as a series of apparatuses through 
which behaviour is actively intervened in, by being continually measured. Therefore, 
it becomes important to analyse how behaviour itself comes to be rendered visible 
and actionable – not only to companies and algorithms, but also to the people who 
use surveillance capitalist platforms. This pursuit involves developing an account of 
what I call surveillance capitalist aesthetics: the aesthetic particularities associated 
with the surveillance capitalist condition.  
 
That said, developing an account of surveillance capitalist aesthetics cannot 
merely fetishize the ‘aesthetic’ – as if only the visible and sensible mattered to this 
regime of accumulation. Indeed, the relationships between surveillance capitalism, 
the behaviours from which it gleans value, and the regimes of measuring, predicting, 
calculating and seeing are quite complex, for a number of reasons. Although 
etymologically, surveillance refers to ‘watching over,’ surveillance capitalism’s 
relationship to ‘watching’ is hardly straightforward. Online users’ data may be directly 
operationalized (by a company’s proprietary machine-learning algorithm, seeking to 
infer gender from online activity, for example), without ever having become ‘visible’ 
to any sort of watcher (whether human or machine). Neither information, nor the 
subjects from whom it is expropriated, is ‘watched’ or ‘seen’ in the strict sense – 
either by machines or by human attendants. Further, there is often a marked tension, 
in surveillance capitalist platforms, between hyper-visible signs of behaviour (for 
instance, star ratings on online sharing platforms, or Fitbit behavioural graphs), and 
the hyper-proprietary means for their calculation. Thus, surveillance capitalism has a 
paradoxical relationship to watching, and to the visible. Further, in attempting to 
develop an account of surveillance capitalist aesthetics, there are many pitfalls to be 
avoided, associated with the study of surveillance more generally: for instance, over-
reliance on mid-twentieth century accounts of surveillance (notably those of Orwell 
and Foucault) – which, though rich and nuanced in their own right, are insufficient to 
account for more recent developments in surveillance. Further, critiques of 
surveillance often tend to focus on the right to privacy, which presupposes that 
privacy is, in fact, a public good – without in any way accounting for the historical, 
cultural, raced and gendered complexities of the construct of privacy itself (Osucha, 
2009; Dubrofsky and Magnet, 2015). These pitfalls exert a certain gravity on the 
discourse, and tend to construct a paranoid account of surveillance (“they are 
watching us!”), often coupled with a nostalgic recourse to a privacy that never was 
either a straightforward right, or necessarily beneficial in the first place.  
 
In light of these complexities, how might it be possible to move toward a 
theory of surveillance capitalist aesthetics that shifts attention to a more nuanced 
account of the performativity of prediction within surveillance capitalism? How might 
artworks and other cultural artefacts try to make sense of the (in)consequential 
nature of the sensible within this regime of accumulation – with its hyper-visible 
subjects and hyper-proprietary means for their interpretation? In what follows, I 
attempt to open up a few avenues of exploration toward a surveillance capitalist 
aesthetics, by remarking the recursive visual and data cultures of reputational value, 
and the particularities of addressivity in surveillance-capitalist scenarios. Both of 
these elements of surveillance capitalist aesthetics can be understood in terms of a 
tension between the consequentiality and inconsequentiality of the visible – the 
strange admixture of highly visible reflexive cues of one’s value to surveillance 
capitalism, and the hiddenness of their calculation. 
 
Surveillance Capitalist Pasts and Futures  
 
Before discussing surveillance capitalist aesthetics, however, it is first 
necessary to say a bit more about surveillance capitalism itself – and to briefly try to 
understand how this regime of accumulation might fit into a larger picture of financial 
and business innovation. Shoshana Zuboff traces the development of surveillance 
capitalism to the beginning in the early 2000s, when new, “born-digital” firms learned 
to capitalize on users’ “data exhaust” – information that they unintentionally left 
behind while using platforms, which revealed something of their online habits 
(Zuboff, 2015: 79). For instance, Google – surveillance capitalism’s most prominent 
pioneer – became profitable when it reinvented its business model, after realizing 
that it could profit from data exhaust it was already collecting accidentally as a by-
product of its activities. Offering email and search services to users meant the 
incidental collection of user data; finally, Google realized it could monetize this data, 
analysing it in order to entice advertisers with the promise of reaching highly 
specialized audiences. From that point forward, users’ online interests and 
behaviours were effectively sold to Google’s advertisers, who would bid for 
prominent spots in online keyword auctions through Google’s AdWords program. 
Gmail users could then click on keywords automatically matched to their interests – 
with the AdWords auction winners’ sites listed most prominently. As Zuboff contends, 
surveillance capitalism’s “unexpected and often illegible mechanisms of extraction, 
commodification, and control… effectively exile persons from their own behavior 
while producing new markets of behavioral prediction and modification” (Zuboff, 
2015: 75).  
 
Even before Zuboff coined the term surveillance capitalism in 2015, there 
were others who had begun to look at the operationalization of predictive practices, 
and their effects on subjects, along similar lines to Zuboff’s analysis. For instance, in 
2011, Karl Palmås wrote about the American casino chain Harrah’s’ real-time 
calculation of ‘pain points’. Gamblers, tracked via loyalty cards, are automatically 
assigned ‘pain points’: a hypothetical amount of losses they would have to incur in 
order to leave the casino, and possibly not come back for a while. When a gambler 
goes over their automatically assigned pain point, ‘luck ambassadors’ arrive on the 
floor to intervene in the gambler’s mood, by treating them out for a steak dinner on 
the house (Palmås, 2011). Evgeny Morozov has written about a Barcelona comedy 
club’s use of pay-per-laugh technology to avoid a tax hike on ticket sales. Customers 
come into the club for free, are analysed using facial recognition technology, and 
then are charged ‘per laugh’ according to how funny they found the show (Morozov, 
2014). Already in 2008, Nigel Thrift argued that there was a new “political economy 
of propensity (2008). 
 
Zuboff insists that data analysis instantiates a power relation, and 
fundamentally changes the behaviours it calculates and predicts (Zuboff, 2015: 75). 
Further, for Zuboff, surveillance capitalism represents a fundamental departure from 
how the neoliberal-era market was envisioned (by Hayek, for instance) as something 
“intrinsically ineffable and unknowable” (Zuboff, 2015: 78). In spite of these novelties, 
then, how might we understand Zuboff’s surveillance capitalism as part of a longer 
trajectory of technological and informatic change? In her previous work, we might 
find something of a history of surveillance capitalism in what she terms the twentieth-
century “informating” of the economy: the process through which the economy is 
rendered information-rich through the integration of smart machines into many 
businesses. The introduction of smart machines into business infrastructures makes 
for a fundamental shift, in Zuboff’s view: for technologies of automation (for instance, 
scanner devices to automate supermarket checkouts) also produce data that can be 
used to change the very systems they measure. Smart automation tools carry the 
capacity to “create a vast overview of an organization’s operations,” which can then 
feed back into the system, changing the ways in which its various activities are 
coordinated and conceived as a whole (Zuboff, 1988: 9). Zuboff limits her analysis of 
informating the economy to the rise of the smart machine in the latter part of the 
twentieth century; elsewhere, I have argued that it might be better to think of a much 
longer development of new economic and financial products – from the first bank 
notes to the first derivatives – as having rendered the milieus in which they acted 
newly informatic (Rosamond, 2018).  
 
Surveillance capitalism might be understood as part of a long, and slowly 
evolving history of ‘informating’ the economy; equally, in future, with the benefit of 
hindsight, its moment might prove to have been fleeting. Recently, Evgeny Morozov 
has argued that profiting from data collection used to provide targeted audiences for 
advertisements might best be understood as only a short-term game for companies 
like Google. The long-term game, Morozov contends, is Artificial Intelligence (AI). 
Tech giants like Google and Facebook can funnel their extensive revenue from 
expropriated behavioural data (or ‘data extractivism’, as he calls it) into research and 
development for AI infrastructures, so as to gain an unchallenged AI monopoly in 
future (Morozov, 2018). Briefly placing surveillance capitalism within a longer 
trajectory reminds us to look at the particularities of surveillance capitalist aesthetics, 
while not overly fixing this account to a presumed-to-be stable set of conditions to 
which they are indexed. Instead, an account of surveillance capitalist aesthetics must 
have in mind an ever-changing political economy.  
 
Why Surveillance Capitalist Aesthetics?  
 
In a milieu in which the signs of performance and behaviour are directly 
operationalized, it becomes important to think through the aesthetics of the signalling 
and signing processes – while all the while keeping in mind that many of means 
through which these signs are utilised are not readily ‘visible’ to either humans or 
machines. In order to construct an account of surveillance capitalist aesthetics, it is 
important to acknowledge that there have, of course, been many accounts already of 
digital and post-digital aesthetics (to name just a few: Barry and Dieter, 2015; Cubitt, 
1998; Koepnick and McGlothlin, 2009; Kwastek, 2013; Lovink, 2003; Manovich, 
2013; Manovich, forthcoming 2020; Marks, 2010). These accounts of digital and 
post-digital aesthetics have varying foci; quite rightly, many of them focus on the 
effects of specific software forms, interactive digital media, and platforms. To add to 
this discussion, I have chosen to focus, here, on the performativity of measures and 
images of online persons, in tandem with the financialization of behaviour endemic to 
surveillance capitalism. My method involves drawing from literary theory – which has 
the potential to complicate accounts of the means through which behavioural 
measures skirt between the (in)visible and the (un-)narratable, and bring accounts of 
the aesthetics of online platforms into contact with the long histories of the 
production of the financial subject in literature (Roxburgh, 2016; Sherman, 1996; 
LaBerge, 2015).  
 
Below, I briefly sketch two aspects of surveillance capitalist aesthetics, both of 
which I have written about at more length elsewhere (Rosamond, 2016; Rosamond, 
2017): online reputation and online addressivity. I want to bring brief versions of 
these accounts together, here, in order to highlight the ways in which they share in 
highlighting the recursivity of measures; and combine proprietary and hyper-visible 
aspects of similar operations, which point to the simultaneous efficacy and 
irrelevance of visuality and sensibility within surveillance capitalist operations.   
 
Section 3: Aesthetics of Reputational Value (600 words) 
 
Many surveillance capitalist platforms involve the performance of reputation. 
Facebook likes, eBay star ratings and Airbnb reviews (among many other measures) 
perform reputability, and produce shared stakes and social ties within networks. The 
ubiquitous display of online reputation measures makes reputation seem newly 
visible, and directly consequential in its visibility. Thus, there is a need to analyse the 
complexities of this apparent visibility by developing an account of the conflicted 
visual and informatic dimensions of online reputation. How might it be possible to 
articulate an aesthetics of online reputation, given that many online environments 
render reputation’s visibility highly consequential (as when, for instance, a customer 
chooses an Airbnb host because of their high host rating) – and yet, the exact 
mechanisms that measure reputation (such as online platforms’ proprietary 
algorithms) remain hidden from view?  
 
 While ‘likes’, ratings and reviews make online reputation highly visible, many 
of the exact methods used for scoring it remain hidden from view. For instance, legal 
scholar Frank Pasquale writes about the myriad ways in which private companies 
collect information on citizens, assigning analyses and scores that may have 
profound effects on people’s lives, even while they remain entirely hidden from view. 
An error in a private database, such as a wrongful designation of “intent to sell and 
manufacture methamphetamines” – as Arkansas resident Catherine Taylor 
experienced – can have knock-on effects, preventing people from getting jobs, flats 
or loans for years (Pasquale, 2015: 33). Even if the wrongfully accused, would be 
meth dealer spots the initial error and gets it corrected – which is already highly 
unlikely – companies share their data with so many other companies that the 
wrongful designation is still likely to have an adverse effect on that person’s 
reputation for years. For Pasquale, such “[r]eputation systems are creating new (and 
largely invisible) minorities, disfavoured due to error or unfairness. Algorithms are not 
immune from the fundamental problem of discrimination, in which negative and 
baseless assumptions congeal into prejudice” (Pasquale, 2015: 38). Algorithmic 
judgements of creditworthiness, hidden both from view and from much legal 
oversight, effectively amount to a “quasi-judicial system of algorithmically scored 
penalties” (Pasquale, 2015: 148). Thus, understanding the surveillance capitalist 
aesthetics of reputation involves accounting for both the hyper-visibility of reputation 
online – its visual efficacy – and its hidden existence at the edges of networked 
personhood: in private databases, analysed by proprietary algorithms, and shared 
between private companies, beyond both accountability and view. To understand the 
efficacy of signs of reputation within surveillance capitalism, then, is to see 
reputation’s recursivity in both the surfaces of online platforms – in likes, stars and 
reviews – and also in the dispersed distances of reputation’s proprietary measures. 
Both the hyper-visible and hidden layers of surveillance capitalist reputation share a 
performative dimension – a situation in which to ‘like’ someone is to make them 
likable, to designate something as reputable is to make it so. But these functions 
take place at various distances to the visible, the narratable, and the hidden from 
view. 
   
Addressivity in Surveillance-Capitalist Scenarios  
 
A similar tension – between the immediately obvious, highly visible aspects of 
online interaction and online platforms’ hidden interactivities – animates addressivity 
in online platforms. I borrow the term ‘addressivity’ from the Russian literary theorist 
Mikhail Bakhtin, who defines it as “the quality of turning to someone” (Bakhtin, 1986: 
99) – or an utterance’s “quality of being addressed to someone” (Bakhtin, 1986: 95). 
For Bakhtin, addressivity is a fundamental constitutive property of any utterance. Yet 
despite being fundamental to the utterance, many analyses of linguistic expression 
either entirely miss or underemphasize addressivity, since it does not appear in any 
of the constituent parts of an utterance (Bakhtin, 1986: 95).  
 
In his late essay “The Problem of Speech Genres,” Bakhtin argues that a 
genre can be defined according to its “typical conception of an addressee” (1986: 
95). What, then, would constitute a typical conception of an addressee, if we move 
from character and novel in Bakhtin, to profile and platform in surveillance 
capitalism?  
 
Extending from Bakhtin’s theory, we could say that surveillance capitalist 
platforms are typified by an imbalance of addressivity. Online users are broadly 
aware that their data may be collected and analysed, they are nonetheless more 
consciously aware of addressing others on social platforms, and less aware of 
addressing automated, algorithmic witnesses. For instance, on online dating sites 
such as OkCupid, automatic gathering and analysis of data is a background 
condition of all its users’ activity; but users’ generic understandings of online dating 
do not sufficiently account for this, as online daters are more focused on addressing 
potential dates through their profiles and messages. OkCupid cofounder Christian 
Rudder’s continual efforts to make online dating data analytics understandable and 
palatable for users (via OkCupid’s promotional material, TED-Ed talks, a blog, and a 
book on data) (Rudder, 2014) arguably aims to address this imbalance – staging the 
platform’s way of understanding its users’ utterances in aggregate. Through 
associated materials that present the data analytics of online dating, OkCupid 
encourages users to develop an interest in, and acceptance of, being automatically 
analyzed as part of large, aggregate data sets, in the background of their online 
dating activities. Insofar as they double the communicability of their users – enabling 
communication between users as they also aggregate and analyze those users in 
the backgrounds of their interactions – surveillance capitalist social media platforms 
produce a particular form of imbalanced addressivity between users and their many 





Within surveillance capitalism, both online reputation and online addressivity 
are hyper-visibile. Reputational measures and acts of addressing users are highly 
noticeable in the design and use of social media platforms. Yet these phenomena 
also have a hidden dimension; they extend to the edges of data analytics’ highly 
dispersed, privatized networks for gathering and sharing information, strongly 
affecting people’s credit and subtly shifting the paradigm of their address to other 
users. Thus, surveillance capitalism instantiates a paradoxical hyper-/in-visibility of 
social cues. No matter at which end of this hyper-visible/invisible spectrum, both are 
highly performative – directly operational. To ‘like’ someone is to make them 
reputable; to automatically score someone highly equally so. Similarly, the act of 
address instantiates the particular sociality of the online platform: its off-balance 
diagram of desires, affiliations and extractions. These nuances of what I term 
surveillance capitalism, I would argue, are essential for thinking through the newer 
iterations of the performativity of finance, in which behaviour itself becomes subject 
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